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We examine how special interests, measured by campaign contributions from the mortgage industry,
and constituent interests, measured by the share of subprime borrowers in a congressional district,
may have influenced U.S. government policy toward the housing sector during the subprime mortgage
credit expansion from 2002 to 2007. Beginning in 2002, mortgage industry campaign contributions
increasingly targeted U.S. representatives from districts with a large fraction of subprime borrowers.
During the expansion years, mortgage industry campaign contributions and the share of subprime
borrowers in a congressional district increasingly predicted congressional voting behavior on housing
related legislation. The evidence suggests that both subprime mortgage lenders and subprime mortgage
borrowers influenced government policy toward housing finance during the subprime mortgage credit
expansion.
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The U.S. government has played a prominent role in the ﬁnancial sector since the estab-
lishment of the Bank of the United States in 1792. Government intervention, at initiation,
is often well intentioned and justiﬁed by economic theory. However, once the government
is involved in the ﬁnancial sector, individuals within the economy have strong incentives to
tailor government policy toward their own objectives. When government oﬃcials respond to
constituent and special interests by manipulating policy, the resulting eﬀects for the ﬁnancial
sector are potentially disastrous. For example, Calomiris (2009) argues that “...government
subsidies or special rights granted to favored participants in the banking system and the in-
centive consequences of those subsidies and rights ... has been at the center of the explanation
of the propensity of banking crises for the past two centuries.”
The importance of understanding how constituent and special interests aﬀect govern-
ment policy toward the ﬁnancial sector has been elevated given the U.S. mortgage default
crisis. Nominal house prices in the U.S. have fallen over 40 percent and the delinquent mort-
gage debt has risen to an astonishing $1.5 trillion. Anecdotal evidence suggests that U.S.
government support for mortgage credit toward low income, low credit quality households
was a main contributor to the severity of the 2008-2009 crisis.1 During the height of the
subprime mortgage credit expansion from 2002 to 2007, government support for mortgage
lending to subprime borrowers took many forms, with support from both Republican and
Democratic fronts. Among the most prominent is the aﬀordable housing mandate imposed
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) on Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae. However, as we discuss below, there were also prominent bills debated and passed in
the U.S. Congress that reduced regulation of subprime lenders and increased mortgage sup-
port for low income households. Some of these bills display prominent bipartisan support,
stemming from both social policy on the left and an “ownership society” discourse on the
1See Leonnig (2008), Barrett (2008), Calomiris and Wallison (2008), and Congleton (2009).
1right.2
In this study, we examine how both constituent and special interests inﬂuenced U.S.
government policy toward the housing sector during the subprime mortgage credit expansion.
The direct eﬀect of these interests on government policy is diﬃcult to estimate for a
variety of reasons. For example, there are many government organizations that oversee
housing ﬁnance and regulation, including the Federal Reserve (consumer protection), HUD,
OFHEO (oversight of Government Sponsored Enterprises, or GSEs, such as Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae), and the United States Congress. Constituent and special interests may
inﬂuence policy at these various organizations in ways that are undetectable to researchers,
such as legislative eﬀort (Hall and Wayman, 1990). In addition, the government eﬀorts
themselves are varied, and so it is diﬃcult to isolate a single bill or single action to estimate
the eﬀect of constituent and special interests on government policy. Such variety has however
also advantages, as we can focus our attention to both bills that became law and bills which
failed but still incorporate information on congressional alignments.
While these problems present a serious challenge, we are able to provide suggestive
evidence that highlights the important role of both constituent and special interests in hous-
ing and housing ﬁnance public policy during the subprime mortgage credit expansion from
2002 to 2007. Taken together, the results suggest that constituent interests, measured with
the fraction of subprime borrowers in a given Congressional district before the subprime
mortgage expansion, and special interests, measured with campaign contributions from the
mortgage industry, both helped to shape government policies that encouraged the rapid
growth of subprime mortgage credit.
We begin with an examination of the pattern of campaign contributions toward repre-
sentatives from districts with a high fraction of subprime borrowers. From 1994 to 2000,
mortgage industry campaign contributions toward these representatives are relative steady.
However, beginning in the 107th Congress (2001-2002), there is a sharp relative rise in
2“Ownership society” is a phrase employed occasionally by President George W. Bush from 2003 onwards,
usually in contexts indicating support for property ownership as a channel towards higher civic engagement.
2mortgage industry campaign contributions toward representatives from high subprime share
districts. The relative increase accelerates through 2006. The magnitude is economically
signiﬁcant: a one standard deviation increase in the fraction of subprime borrowers in a
given district leads to an 80 percentage point increase in the growth of mortgage campaign
contributions from 2002 to 2006. In contrast, we see no eﬀect for non-mortgage ﬁnancial
industry campaign contributions.
This result demonstrates that the mortgage industry increasingly targeted representa-
tives of subprime borrowers during the subprime lending expansion. An obvious question in
light of this ﬁnding is: What precise votes are being bought with the money? One diﬃculty
in answering this question is the large number of bills that are related to subprime lend-
ing and the housing market: from the 103rd Congress (1993-1994) to the 110th Congress
(2007-2008), over 700 roll calls in the House alone were related to “aﬀordable housing,”
“homeownership,” or “subprime” according to the Congressional Research Service.3 One of
the prerequisites for analyzing the determinants of congressional voting behavior is that the
competing interests are well deﬁned (Peltzman (1984), (1985)). Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult
to consistently deﬁne competing interests for such a large number of heterogenous bills.
In light of this diﬃculty, we adopt an alternative approach to examining voting patterns
on each single roll call. We aggregate all roll call votes for any legislation related to subprime
lending, aﬀordable housing or homeownership, and we ﬁnd that the predictive power of
mortgage campaign contributions on a representative’s voting behavior increases sharply
during the subprime mortgage credit expansion. More speciﬁcally, the fraction of votes for
which mortgage campaign contributions have an eﬀect on voting patterns that is signiﬁcantly
distinct from zero at the 95% conﬁdence level increases from 3% in the 104th Congress (1995-
1996) to 20% in the 108th Congress (2003-2004). In contrast, over the same time period,
3Starting from the 111th Congress, CRS has moved to a new Subject Terms classiﬁcation. According to
the Library of Congress “Terms assigned to legislation from the 110th and earlier Congresses came from a list
that was based upon a thesaurus known as the Legislative Indexing Vocabulary (LIV). CRS plans to convert
the LIV terms assigned to bills from the 93rd through the 110th Congresses to the new Subject terms as
time and resources permit.” We employ the terms “aﬀordable housing,” “homeownership,” and “subprime”
under the old classiﬁcation.
3there is no discernible trend in the explanatory power of campaign contributions from the
non-mortgage ﬁnancial sector.
However, the story is more complex than just subprime lenders buying government
support for subprime lending. We also ﬁnd a sharp increase in the statistical strength of
constituent interests in predicting votes on subprime lending related legislation. More specif-
ically, the fraction of subprime borrowers in a given representative’s congressional district
becomes a more powerful determinant for roll call votes on subprime legislation during the
subprime lending expansion. In the 105th Congress (1997-1998), the fraction of subprime
borrowers in a representative’s district signiﬁcantly predicts the representative’s votes on
only 30% of roll calls; by the 108th Congress (2003-2004), it increases to 70%.
Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that politicians responded to both special and
constituent interests when supporting policies related to the expansion of subprime lending.
In the ﬁnal section of the study, we examine voting and co-sponsorship patterns on six
bills for which competing interests are better deﬁn e dt h a nf o rm o s th o u s i n g - r e l a t e dl e g i s -
lation: The American Dream Downpayment Act of 2003 (ADDA) which aimed to increase
homeownership among low-income communities by providing downpayment and closing cost
assistance; the Ney-Kanjorski Responsible Lending Act of 2005 (RLA) which would have
preempted state regulations on predatory lending; the Prohibit Predatory Lending Act of
2005 (PPLA) which would have placed more stringent controls on subprime lenders; the
Mortgage Reform and Predatory Lending Act of 2007, which was a revised version of the
PPLA that eventually passed the House (but failed in the Senate); and the Federal Housing
Finance Reform Acts of 2005 and 2007, which sought to tighten regulation of Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae. Our ﬁndings on the determinants of voting and co-sponsorship patterns
on these speciﬁc bills are broadly consistent with the view that both constituent and special
interests jointly played an important role in government support for the expansion of sub-
prime mortgages. Our bills include a varied sample of legislation, some of it introduced in
periods of republican majority of Congress (until 2006), other introduced and passed under
4a democratic Congress (110th).
There is a large literature on the determinants of congressional voting which would
be impossible to review here for lack of space.4 However, a sub-branch of that literature
has been investigating voting on ﬁnancial legislation. Romer and Weingast (1991) present
a thorough investigation of the legislation around the saving and loans crisis in the 1980s.
Nunez and Rosenthal (2004) investigate bankruptcy reform voting in the mid 2000s. Berglof
and Rosenthal (2003) portray the historical evolution of bankruptcy legislation in Congress.
Our ﬁndings on campaign contributions are complementary to the ﬁndings of Igan,
Mishra, and Tressel (2009), who examine how lobbying expenditures by subprime lenders
are correlated with both mortgage lending patterns and subsequent default rates.5 Ak e y
distinction is that our ﬁndings suggest that both special and constituent interests inﬂuenced
public policy supporting subprime mortgage lending. Our ﬁndings are also related to Mian,
Suﬁ, and Trebbi (2010) who study the eﬀect of special interests, constituent interests and
their interaction on legislation during the subprime mortgage default crisis in 2008.6 In a
recent paper Epstein, O’Halloran, and McAllister (2010) also follow a similar approach to
ours, reviewing a comprehensive sample of ﬁnancial sector legislation since 1950. Their focus
is however on regulatory delegation from Congress to the executive branch.7
In the next section we provide background on government policies that may have facili-
tated the expansion of subprime mortgages. Section 3 presents data and summary statistics.
Sections 4 through 6 present results and Section 7 presents our conclusions.
4An comprehensive review is available in Poole and Rosenthal (1997).
5As discussed in detail in the following sections, a main advantage of employing campaign contributions
is that it allows a precise match between source and target of the political inﬂuence link. While campaign
contributions from the mortgage industry can be directly linked to speciﬁc politicians due to Federal Election
Commissions requirements, the lobbying activity of the mortgage industry cannot (lobbying reports lack such
information).
6Mian, Suﬁ, and Trebbi (2010) also contains a more complete review of the politico-economic literature
on special and constituent interests to which we refer.
7A discussion of ﬁnancial legislation and the hystorical patterns of deregulation can be also found in
Kroszner and Strahan (1999) and Philippon and Reshef (2008).
5II. Public Policy and Subprime Mortgages
The dramatic relative growth in mortgage credit to low credit quality households was
the primary driver of the mortgage default crisis and the resulting ﬁnancial crisis (Mian and
Suﬁ (2009)). This expansion of subprime credit coincided with important U.S. government
policies that may have contributed to this pattern. One such policy is the increase by
HUD of the aﬀordable housing mandate for both Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in 2000
and 2004.8 The aﬀordable housing mandate, which is a requirement that Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae purchase a fraction of mortgages that serve low to moderate income borrowers,
was increased from 42% to 50% in 2000, and from 50% to 56% in 2004. The increase in
the aﬀordable housing mandate led to a sharp increase in the fraction of subprime mortgage
backed securities purchased by the agencies. For example, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
purchased almost no subprime mortgage backed securities in 2000. Between 2004 and 2006,
the two agencies purchased $434 billion in securities backed by subprime loans.
The decision by HUD illustrates the diﬃculty in determining the inﬂuence of special
interests and constituent interests on policy. It is likely that HUD increased the aﬀordable
housing mandate in part due to both mortgage lender and congressional pressure. Indeed,
this contention is made forcefully in several opinion pieces by journalists and economists.9
However, it is diﬃcult to measure the pressure exerted by various interests on HUD. The same
can be said of regulatory decisions regarding consumer protection and predatory lending. In
what follows we make an eﬀort in this direction by focusing on lobbying on the HUD.
There were also a very large number of bills in the U.S. Congress related to mortgage
lending. More speciﬁcally, there were over 700 roll call votes on bills related to “aﬀordable
housing,” “homeownership,” or “subprime” during the period of subprime mortgage credit
expansion. Igan, Mishra, and Tressel (2009) describe 33 of these bills in their appendix. We
choose to focus on six bills for which the competing interests are reasonably well deﬁned.
8Background information on the aﬀordable housing mandate is from Leonnig (2008) and Barrett (2008).
9See for example Calomiris and Wallison (2008) and Gigot (2008).
6First, in December 2003, the American Dream Downpayment Act (ADDA, H.R. 1276)
was signed into law. The act provided $200 million annually for downpayment assistance to
low-income ﬁrst-time homebuyers and increased the loan limit for Federal Housing Adminis-
tration insurance for purchasing multifamily units in high cost areas.10 A c c o r d i n gt oH U D ’ s
website,11 the downpayment assistance was created to “increase the homeownership rate,
especially among lower income and minority households.” The Act enjoyed broad bipartisan
support; it was passed by unanimous consent in the Senate and without objection in the
House of Representatives.12
Further, despite pressure from consumer advocacy groups,13 there was no major legisla-
tion passed by the U.S. Federal Government to impose stricter regulations on the subprime
mortgage industry during the period of dramatic subprime lending growth. In contrast,
the Responsible Lending Act (RLA) of 2005 (H.R. 1295) introduced by Rep. Robert Ney
from Ohio and Rep. Paul Kanjorski from Pennsylvania in the 109th Congress would have
“preempt[ed] state mortgage laws with a federal standard” (Shenn (2005)). Consumer advo-
cacy groups and state regulators were strongly opposed to the Act given that it would have
replaced tougher state-mandated consumer protections with weaker federal protections.14
The Act was never passed, in part because Rep. Ney was implicated in the Jack Abramoﬀ
corruption scandal shortly after its introduction.
Also in the 109th Congress, legislation targeting predatory lending was introduced by
Representative Bradley Miller under the name Prohibit Predatory Lending Act (PPLA) of
10For more information on the ADDA, see "Bush Signs Downpayment Act," National Mortgage News,
December 29, 2003.
11See http://www.hud.gov/oﬃces/cpd/aﬀordablehousing/programs/home/addi/.
12Other legislative measures were simultaneously considered, including, H.R. 3755, the Zero Downpayment
Act, introduced by Rep. Pat Tiberi of Ohio and David Scott of Georgia on February 3, 2004. In May 5,
2004 at the House Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity
hearing Rep. Robert Ney indicated: "It would provide a program to eliminate the downpayment requirement
for certain families and individuals who buy homes with FHA-insured mortgages."
13For example, the House Banking Committee held a hearing on May 24th, 2000 that addressed the rising
subprime market and the problem of “predatory lending.” Several consumer advocacy groups called for
stricter regulation. See Common Cause (2008).
14See Gallagher (2005), Center for Responsible Lending (2005), and Common Cause (2008). The Center for
Responsible Lending (2005) argued in 2005 that “the Ney-Kanjorski bill pending in Congress and supported
by much of the lending industry would gut the strong laws in these states.”
72005 (H.R. 1182). The Miller legislation was based on North Carolina’s predatory lending
statute, which according to the Center for Responsible Lending (2005), is “widely considered
the model for preventing abusive lending while preserving access to credit”. Indeed consumer
advocates directly contrasted the PPLA with the RLA as being the legislation that would
eﬀectively reduce predatory lending.15 The legislation was referred to committee and was
never voted upon in the House of Representatives.
During the subprime mortgage default crisis, Representative Miller sponsored closely
related legislation in the 110th Congress, the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending
Act of 2007. Like the earlier legislation, this bill targeted predatory lending and was widely
supported by consumer advocacy groups. The bill passed the House but was never taken up
for a vote in the Senate.
In addition to these four pieces of legislation, we also examine two diﬀerent versions
of the Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2005 (H.R. 1461) and of 2007 (H.R. 1427).
According to the Financial Times “The House bill, the 2005 Federal Housing Finance Reform
Act, would have created a stronger regulator with new powers to increase capital at Fannie
and Freddie, to limit their portfolios and to deal with the possibility of receivership.”16
Both bills passed the House in the 109th and 110th Congress respectively, but died due to
perceived weakness of the overall legislative eﬀort in the Senate and opposition by the Bush
administration.
Related to the oversight of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, congressional majorities of
both parties consistently rejected amendments aiming at constraining GSEs balance sheets
and limiting their systemic risk role. The evidence is derived from roll calls on speciﬁc
amendments to the Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2005 and then again in 2007
(Congress changed its majority party to Democratic with the November 2006 elections).
Speciﬁcally, amendment number 600 of the 2005 version of the FHFRA is described as an




8“Amendment sought to authorize the regulator to require one or both of the GSEs to dispose
or acquire assets or liabilities if the regulator deems those assets or liabilities to be a potential
systemic risk to the housing or capital markets, or the ﬁnancial system.” Amendment number
207 of the 2007 version of the FHFRA speciﬁes that the “Amendment clariﬁes the authority
of regulators over government sponsored enterprises ... to clarify that potential risks should
be posed to the enterprises with respect to the nature of portfolio holdings.”
Commissioner Keith Hennessey, member of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, in
his April 2010 questioning of Alan Greenspan refers in detail to this amendment:
“[...]Now, there was an amendment; it was House Amendment 207; it passed the House
on May 22nd, 2007, on a 383 to 36 vote. That is an overwhelming bipartisan vote. And
what that amendment did is it limited the new housing regulator’s authorities. It said that
the new housing regulator can only consider the risk that these portfolios place to the safety
and soundness of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, not to the ﬁnancial system as a whole.
What I want to do is I want to read to you language from the sponsor of the amendment,
Mr. Neugebauer, he said, this legislation clariﬁes that when a regulator looks at regulating
this entity that he looks at the safety and soundness of that entity and not external factors.
He later says, we shouldn’t put things out there that the regulator is not able to quite honestly
articulate, because what is a systemic risk? That becomes a point of order that sometimes
t h er e g u l a t o rc a n n o te x p l a i ne x a c t l yt h es y s t e m i cr i s ki st h e yb e l i e v ei ti s .I ti saw a yt ol i m i t
their portfolios.
So, in eﬀect, 221 House Democrats and 162 House Republicans voted to preclude the
regulator from being able to consider systemic risk with the GSE portfolios [...].” 17
We study these amendments in addition to the co-sponsorship and passage votes on the
FHFRAs.
17The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commision, Oﬃcial Transcript Commission Hearing of April 7, 2010, pp.
82-83.
9III. Data and Summary Statistics
A. Data
Our analysis of the determinants of government policy toward the housing sector during
the subprime mortgage credit expansion utilizes three main sets of data: consumer credit
score data, congressional electoral and voting data, and campaign contribution and lobbying
expenditure data. Data on consumer credit scores are from Equifax Predictive Services.
Equifax collects these data from consumer credit reports, and aggregates the information at
the zip code level. These data are available at an annual frequency from 1991 to 1997, and
at a quarterly frequency from 1998 through the fourth quarter of 2007. Our key measure of
constituent interests as it relates to subprime lending is the fraction of individuals in a zip
code with a credit score less than 660.18
In order to aggregate zip code level data to the congressional district level, we utilize the
MABLE-Geocorr software.19 One complication in the matching procedure is the redistricting
that occurs between the 107th (2001-2002) and 108th (2003-2004) Congresses. In order to
account for redistricting, we construct a measure of match quality which is the fraction of the
2002 population that belongs to the same congressional district in 2003 after the redistricting.
Match quality across Congresses based on shared population is presented in Figure 1. The
ﬁgure shows that 75 percent of all post-redistricting districts include more than 60 percent
of the population of the previous district. In the panel data set analysis that tracks districts
over time, we utilize match quality in robustness tests to ensure that redistricting does not
inﬂuence our results.
Our second main data set covers congressional district electoral and voting behavior in
18See Mian and Suﬁ (2009) for further details on the Equifax data. As they note, an individual with a
credit score below 660 is widely considered a “subprime” borrower.
19Supported by the Missouri Census Data Center. Zip codes are 5-digit ZIP (ZCTA-ZIP Census Tab.
Area 2000) and matched respectively to the 106th (1999-2000), 108th (2003-2004) and 109th (2005-2006)
congressional districts. Redistricting for all other congresses was implemented using data on geographic
overlap kindly provided by Chris Berry at the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy. All the
aggregates are population weighted sums.
10the House of Representatives. These data include party aﬃliation, number of terms in oﬃce,
committee assignments of the representatives from the district (Stewart and Woon (2008)),
and the DW-Nominate representative ideology scores which are increasing in conservatism
(Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 2007)).20 The roll call votes come from Keith Poole’s vote-
view.com data base, and were cross-referred to Govtracks.com listing of CRS subject terms.
co-sponsorship information was obtained from Govtracks.com.
Our third main data set covers spending by special interest groups. In particular, our
data set covers two main channels of special interest group spending: campaign contribu-
tions (i.e., resources given to politicians to ﬁnance their electoral campaigns) and lobbying
expenditures (i.e., resources spent by clients that hire lobbyists to directly petition the gov-
ernment). We obtain campaign contributions data from the Center for Responsive Politics
(CRP), a nonpartisan and nonproﬁt organization, which directly collects the information
from the Federal Election Commission political contributions reports.21 The advantage of
the CRP data is that it covers contributions from Political Action Committees (PACs, the
main channel for ﬁrms’ political activity) and individual contributions (above $200)s o r t e d
on the basis of the contributor’s employer. This allows for a comprehensive measurement of
the overall contributions of a speciﬁc industry. Our main industry of interest is the mortgage
bankers and brokers industry, which is deﬁned by CRP as a subcategory of the real estate
sector. The top contributors from the mortgage-banking category in 2006 include Fannie
Mae, the Mortgage Bankers Association of America (MBA) and Freddie Mac.22 In robust-
ness tests, we also examine contribution data for all industries listed by the CRP under the
classiﬁcation “Finance, Real Estate and Insurance”.
L o b b y i n ge x p e n d i t u r ed a t ac o m ef r o mt h eC R Pa n df r o mt h eS e n a t eO ﬃce of Public
20Within the political science literature DW-nominate is one of the most popular proxies for ideology. In
extreme synthesis, the DW-Nominate score is an estimated ideological position based on the legislator’s past
roll call voting records within a random utility choice model (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997 and 2007).
21See http://www.opensecrets.org and http://www.fec.gov/disclosure.shtml
22Other trade associations included in the industry are: Mortgage Insurance Companies of America,
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association. Firms belonging to the class of donors include Countrywide
Financial, Ameriquest Capital, New Century Financial Corp.
11Records lobbying disclosure database. The CRP collects this information directly from the
Senate Oﬃce of Public Records, which reports lobbying disclosure reports in accordance with
the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995. Data are aggregated at the industry level based
on the industry of the client hiring the lobbyist ﬁling the report. Reports are available at a
semiannual frequency starting from 1998 to 2008 and quarterly since 2009. A drawback of the
lobbying disclosure legislation is that it does not require information on the speciﬁcm e m b e r s
of Congress lobbied. Instead, the required information is limited to the governmental agency
lobbied (i.e., the House or the Senate). While the data are useful in analyzing aggregate
industry lobbying dynamics, no link can be traced to speciﬁc politicians.23
B. Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table I presents summary statistics at the congressional district-session
level. Our sample covers the 103rd through 109th Congress, spanning 1993 to 2007. The
average campaign contribution amount from the mortgage industry per congressional district
per session is $3,306. For all other ﬁnancial industries, the average campaign contribution
amount is $113,268.
A main advantage of the political contribution data is that we are able to precisely
measure the industry that gives the donation and the representative that receives the money.
The presence of the donation clearly indicates a link (albeit not necessarily a “contact” or not
necessarily “access”). An obvious drawback is the small magnitude of the donation amounts,
which obscures the intensity of the link. This is in part due to the fact that campaign ﬁnance
laws put severe restrictions on the size of donations that can be given to representatives. The
lobbying expenditure data allow us to partially overcome the problem of small magnitudes
given that lobbying is a form of political inﬂuence that involves an order of magnitude
more resources than campaign contributions. The drawback of the lobbying data is that
we cannot link an industry’s lobbying to a speciﬁc representative. In the analysis below,
23For a discussion see Ansolabehere, Snyder and Tripathi. (2002) and Bombardini and Trebbi (2008b).
12we utilize both disaggregated campaign donation data and aggregate lobbying expenditure
data to analyze the determinants of government policy toward the housing sector during the
subprime mortgage credit expansion from 2001 to 2006.
On average, a congressional district has 33% of its residents that are subprime in terms of
credit scores. Panel A also includes 2000 Census information on race, income, and education.
In terms of characteristics of the representatives, 52% are Republicans and on average the
DW-Nominate score, which varies from −1 to 1 is 0.04.E x a c t l y15% of the representatives
serve on the Financial Services Committee in the House.
Panel B presents summary statistics on voting patterns for the major pieces of legislation
that we discuss in Section 2. A large fraction of both Republicans and Democrats co-
sponsored the ADDA of 2003. Democrats were much more likely to co-sponsor and vote
for the Miller legislation on predatory lending, while both Republicans and Democrats were
equally likely to co-sponsor the Ney legislation that weakened predatory lending regulation.
The FHFRA Acts of 2005 and 2007 were passed on largely partisan votes, but a substantial
fraction of the opposition party also voted for the legislation. In Section 6, we explore the
determinants of these voting and co-sponsorship patterns.
IV. Campaign Contribution Trends
A. Aggregate Trends in Mortgage Industry Lobbying Expenditure and
Campaign Contributions
Figure 2A shows aggregate trends in mortgage brokers and bankers industry campaign
contributions (top) and mortgage industry lobbying expenditures (bottom). Campaign con-
tributions by both mortgage lenders and other ﬁnancial ﬁrms experience an increase from
1998 to 2002. However, beginning in 2002, there is a sharp relative increase in mortgage
industry campaign contributions. From 2002 to 2006, mortgage industry campaign contri-
butions increase by 80%,r e l a t i v et oa40% increase in campaign contributions from other
ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
13The bottom panel shows that lobbying expenditures by the mortgage industry increase
from 1998 to 2001. However, beginning in 2001, lobbying expenditure by the mortgage
industry increases more rapidly, doubling from $25 million to almost $50 million in 2004.
From 2005, the increase in mortgage industry lobbying stops and a gradual decline begins
t h a tl a s t su n t i lt h ee n do ft h es a m p l e .
The sharp increase in mortgage industry campaign contributions and campaign lobby
expenditure coincides with a sharp increase in securitization and mortgage lending to high
subprime zip codes that occurs from 2001 to 2006 (Mian and Suﬁ (2009)). Igan, Mishra,
and Tressel (2009) show that mortgage lenders with higher lobbying expenditures had more
aggressive lending patterns during the mortgage credit expansion and higher default rates
during the mortgage default crisis.
Figure 2B shows disaggregate trends in lobbying expenditures where the business reports
HUD as a target of the lobbying. We only consider reports by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and Countrywide Financial. There is one important caveat on these data: lobbying reports
typically include several diﬀerent agencies and diﬀerent issues beyond housing. Figure 2B
shows a distinct pattern: lobbying of HUD by Fannie Mae and Countrywide Financial is
a leading indicator for subprime lending growth. From 2001 to 2005, there was a sharp
increase in lobbying by these organizations, which collapses subsequently. Fannie Mae’s
lobbying alone accounted for 20% of overall lobbying by the whole industry in 2004.
B. Mortgage Industry Campaign Donations and Subprime Constituents
Is the increase in campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures by the mortgage
industry directly linked to U.S. government policies which may have contributed to the sub-
prime mortgage credit expansion? In this section, we examine this question by exploiting
variation across congressional districts in the share of the population that has a credit score
below 660 as of 1998 (before expansion of subprime mortgage credit). Subprime borrowers
below 660 are the most likely recipients of new mortgages during the expansion in securi-
14tization and subprime mortgage credit that occurs between 2001 and 2006.24 Our analysis
in this section is designed to test whether mortgage industry campaign contributions target
representatives from districts in which the constituents are most likely to obtain subprime
mortgages.
Figure 3 plots the βt coeﬃcients from the following linear regression speciﬁcation for




δt ∗ CongressionalCycleYeart +
X
βt ∗ CongressionalCycleYeart ∗ SubprimeSharei,1998
In other words, Figure 3 plots the diﬀerential increase in mortgage industry campaign
contributions for congressional districts with a high fraction of subprime borrowers as of 1998.
As the solid line in Figure 3 shows, there is no relative diﬀerential pattern in donations by the
mortgage industry from 1992 through 2000. However, beginning with the 107th Congress in
2002, there is a sharp relative increase in mortgage campaign contributions to high subprime
share districts. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient in the 109th Congress (2005-2006) implies
that a one standard deviation increase in the subprime share as of 1998 (0.09)l e a d st oa
relative increase in the growth rate of mortgage industry campaign contributions of 81%.
This point estimate is statistically distinct from the 106th Congress (1999-2000) estimate
(β2000)a tt h e5% signiﬁcance level. In other words, the relative increase in the growth rate
of mortgage industry campaign contributions to high subprime share congressional districts
from 2000 to 2006 is both economically and statistically signiﬁcant.
24See Piskorski, Seru and Vig (2008) and Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig (2010) for more information
on credit scores and subprime mortgage securitization. Non-GSE subprime mortgage securitization agents
target borrowers with a credit score below 660 given that GSEs have limits on mortgages to borrowers below
this credit score. For example, as of June 2008, conforming jumbo mortgages for Freddie Mac must have a
score of at least 660. See http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/increased_limits.html. Consistent with
this evidence, Mian and Suﬁ (2009) ﬁnd that zip codes with a high fraction of borrowers with a credit score
less than 660 experience a sharp relative increase in securitization from 2001 to 2005.
15The results in Figure 3 display a strong relative increase in mortgage industry campaign
contributions to representatives from congressional districts with a high fraction of subprime
borrowers. The increase is concentrated from 2002 to 2007, which is the exact period in
which important government policies were implemented that may have contributed to the
sharp increase in subprime mortgage lending.
In order to further corroborate this result, Figure 3 also plots the diﬀerential increase
in non-mortgage industry ﬁnancial campaign contributions for congressional districts with a




δt ∗ CongressionalCycleYeart +
X
βt ∗ CongressionalCycleYeart ∗ SubprimeSharei,1998
As the dotted line shows, the relative non-mortgage campaign contributions for high
subprime share districts is steady throughout during the sample period. In other words,
the diﬀerential path of campaign contributions toward representatives from high subprime
share districts is unique to the mortgage industry. This evidence suggests that the mortgage
industry viewed high subprime share representatives as potential allies in shaping subprime
market legislation. Our interpretation, albeit circumstantial, points to the convergence of
special and constituent interests in Congress, an issue we further explore below.
V. Constituent and Special Interest Eﬀects on Roll Call Votes
The empirical tests in this section attempt to discern the inﬂuence of constituent and
special interests by examining roll call votes on the very large number of bills associated with
subprime lending. More speciﬁcally, there are over 700 roll call votes recorded that have one
of the following three terms in the description: “aﬀordable housing”, “homeownership”, or
“subprime.” Figure 4 shows the number of bills with each of these terms for each congressional
16t e r mf r o m1 9 9 4t o2 0 0 8 .
Our empirical approach is designed to detect how constituents and special interests
align voting patterns on this large body of legislation. More speciﬁcally, for each of these
approximately 700 votes, we estimate the following cross-sectional speciﬁcation:
Vo t e i = α + β1 ∗ Ln(MortgageContributionsi)+β2 ∗ SubprimeSharei (1)
+β3 ∗ DWNomi + Γ ∗ Xi + εi
In speciﬁcation (1), our measure of constituent interests is the share of subprime borrow-
ers in the congressional district and our measure of special interests is campaign contributions
from the mortgage industry25. We include the DW-Nominate ﬁrst dimension score as a mea-
sure of political ideology, as a standard control in political science voting speciﬁcations of
recent Congresses26, and we include a comprehensive set of control variables (X)f o rt h e
fraction of the district that is black and Hispanic, the natural logarithm of household income
in the district, the fraction living in poverty, the fraction with an education level less than
high school and the fraction with just a high school education. We also include in the control
variable set X a dummy for whether the representative serves on the ﬁnancial committee,
the number of terms served by the representative and, as a benchmark, the log of campaign
contributions from non-mortgage related ﬁnancial institutions.
We estimate the above equation for every roll call vote, and we record the fraction of
all bills in a given congressional cycle in which the estimated coeﬃcients of β1and β2 are
statistically signiﬁcantly distinct from 0 at least at the 5% conﬁdence level. By tracing the
statistical signiﬁcance of the mortgage contributions and the subprime share we are able
to detect the share of bills for which these variables have statistical explanatory power and
follow how such share changes over time. In particular, any share consistently above 5%
25See Stratmann (2002), (2005).
26For a discussion on the fundamental role of ideology in congressional voting see Bernstein (1989), Kau
and Rubin (1979), (1990), Kalt and Zupan (1984) and (1990) and Dougan and Munger (1989).
17will indicate statistical correlation beyond pure Type I error and if the share of statistically
signiﬁcant bills systematically increases over time, then the explanatory power of constituent
and special interests must be increasing.
This approach to legislative voting analysis has some useful features and some evident
drawbacks. One useful feature is that by focusing on statistical signiﬁcance as opposed to
the direction and size of coeﬃcients we can abstract from arbitrarily classifying roll calls into
“for” and “against” subprime credit expansion, and we are able to aggregate a very large
number of heterogenous bills. A disadvantage of this approach is that all the important in-
formation contained in speciﬁc bills and amendments is lost. In particular, roll calls in which
constituent and special interests align are treated identically to bills in which constituent
and special interests contrast.
Another drawback is that for all cross-sectional speciﬁcations, the set X h a st ob er e l -
atively large in order to avoid picking up spurious correlations. Employing a comprehensive
covariate set X for the bills is even more necessary here under the substantial degree of het-
erogeneity of the roll calls studied (including issue-speciﬁc bills, omnibus legislative vehicles,
speciﬁc amendments). Failing to include a substantial number of covariates invalidates the
approach, as any time-varying pattern in the relevance of such omitted covariates would be
picked up by our variables of interests.27
In order to give more weight to legislation that has a larger impact, we also re-weight
the results by a measure of media coverage of the bills based on number of counts of search
hits on the Google News application.28 Given that the enumeration of House bills repeats
itself at every Congress, Google News archive is particularly useful, as it allows to identify
the speciﬁct i m ep e r i o do v e rw h i c ht h es e a r c hi sr u n .E a c hs e a r c hi sr u no nt h es p e c i ﬁcb i l l
number and irrelevant hits or hits that are not in English were manually dropped.
The results for β1 are in Figure 5. Focusing on the Google-weighted results, there is a
27In the appendix ﬁgure, we show what would happen to our analysis if the conditioning set X were to be
dropped. By picking up correlations with covariates that may occasionally turn out to be signiﬁcant, any
systematic pattern of β1and β2 is lost.
28Speciﬁcally we employ news.google.com in its “archive” version and select a relevant time window.
18sharp increase in the fraction of housing or housing ﬁnance related legislation for which the
estimate of β1 is signiﬁcant at the 5% conﬁdence level. In other words, contributions from
the mortgage industry are increasingly powerful at explaining voting patterns on legislation
related to subprime mortgages from 2000 to 2004. The magnitude is quite large: the coeﬃ-
cient estimate is signiﬁcant in only 6% of the Google-weighted votes as of the 103rd Congress
(1993-1994), but then increases sharply to 12% in the 108th Congress (2003-2004). The in-
crease corresponds exactly to the time period in which subprime mortgage credit expanded
most dramatically. The unweighted results show a similar pattern, but the fraction is higher
in the 103rd and 104th Congresses.
T h er e s u l t sf o rβ2 are in Figure 6. Similar to the results in Figure 5, the eﬀect of con-
stituent interests on voting pattern increases substantially from 2000 to 2004. The fraction
of subprime borrowers living in a congressional district seems to inﬂuence voting patterns on
housing or housing ﬁnance related legislation much more in 2004 than in 1996. The fraction
of subprime borrowers is signiﬁcant in only 40% of the Google-weighted votes at the begin-
ning of the sample, but jumps to 60% in the 108th Congress (2003-2004) when subprime
lending was at its peak.
O n ew o r r yw i t ht h ea b o v eﬁndings is that a secular trend is driving the results. For
example, one concern is that representatives in this time period are becoming more sensitive
to campaign contributions from any sector, not just mortgage lenders. In Figure 7, we
present a falsiﬁcation test where we examine the fraction of votes in a given year in which
non-mortgage ﬁnancial industry contributions aﬀect votes on housing and housing ﬁnance
related legislation (this variable is present as a control in every regression). From the 103rd
Congress (1993-1994) to the 108th Congress (2003-2004), there is no discernible trend in the
inﬂuence of non-mortgage ﬁnancial industry contributions on voting patterns. In the 109th
(2005-2006) and 110th Congress (2007-2008), there is an increase in the explanatory power
of non-mortgage ﬁnancial industry contributions, but this corresponds to the period in which
the subprime mortgage crisis threatened all ﬁnancial institutions, not just mortgage lenders.
19VI. Analysis of Mortgage-Related Legislation
In this section, we follow a more standard approach to legislative voting analysis and
focus on eleven co-sponsorships and votes concerning six major legislative initiatives during
the subprime expansion. In all co-sponsorship and voting regressions we ﬁrst present the
simple univariate regression of the house vote or co-sponsorship on the logarithm of campaign
contributions from the mortgage industry. We then augment it with non-mortgage ﬁnance
campaign contributions, ideology, and subprime share controls, and ﬁnally we report the
full speciﬁcation (1), as employed in the previous section. We choose these bills because
the competing interests are better deﬁned than for most legislation. However, an important
caveat is that even with these bills, complexities of the legislation and the legislative process
make it diﬃcult to precisely measure these interests.
In Table II we present two co-sponsorship analyses that show a strong alignment with
special interests: the American Dream Downpayment Act of 2003 and the Responsible Lend-
ing Act of 2005. As mentioned above, the ADDA was passed unanimously whereas the RLA
was withdrawn. Table II displays across all speciﬁcations (1)-(6) a stable and statistically
signiﬁcant semi-elasticity of co-sponsorship with respect to mortgage campaign contribu-
tions of about 0.01. Absent a clear empirical strategy to isolate the causal eﬀect of campaign
contributions on co-sponsorship activity, we cannot tell whether contributions are causing
co-sponsorship or whether contributions go to allies that are more likely to co-sponsor re-
gardless of the contributions29. In either case, the evidence suggests an alliance between
co-sponsors and the mortgage industry.
Table III presents an analysis of the Prohibit Predatory Lending Act (PPLA) of 2005
and the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, both legislation generally
perceived as restrictive of predatory lending and both sponsored by Congressman Bradley
Miller. We explore the co-sponsorship patterns of both and the House vote on passage for the
29See for example Grier, Munger, Roberts (1994), Stratmann (2002), Mian, Suﬁ and Trebbi (2010) and
Stratmann (2005) for a discussion.
20Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act. Neither legislative eﬀorts were signed
into law. Although both bills were perceived as anti-mortgage industry, no clear pattern
between co-sponsorship and campaign contributions is discernible in the table.
In columns (2) and (5) the share of subprime borrowers in the district displays a positive
and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. However, this appears to be driven by the cross-
correlation with the minority fraction. As shown in columns (3) and (6), the addition of
controls for minority share leads to a negative eﬀect of subprime share on the 2005 and 2007
co-sponsorship, although the latter is not signiﬁcant at a reasonable conﬁdence level. The
evidence weakly suggests that representatives from districts with a high fraction of subprime
borrowers (after controlling for minority share) were less likely to co-sponsor legislation that
was broadly perceived as anti-industry.
Tables IV and V present an analysis of two versions of the Federal Housing Finance
Reform Act, the 2005 and the 2007 bills. Although there were important diﬀerences, the two
bills shared the goal of reforming GSEs and Federal Home Loan Banks regulatory oversight.
They also pushed aﬀordable housing provisions by establishing an “Aﬀordable Housing Fund”
for very low income families. Finally, both bills sought to establish the Federal Housing
F i n a n c eA g e n c y( F H F A )t oo v e r s e et h ea c t i v i t i e so fF a n n i eM a ea n dF r e d d i eM a c .
One diﬃculty in interpreting patterns on these two bills is their complexity. They
covered a host of issues and were perceived diﬀerently by diﬀerent parties. For example, the
Bush administration opposed that 2005 bill because it “fail[ed] to include key elements that
are essential to protect the safety and soundness of the housing ﬁnance system ...”.30 In
other words, the administration viewed the 2005 legislation as being weak on regulation of
GSEs. Consistent with this view, representatives that co-sponsored the legislation received
higher mortgage industry contributions, as is evident from columns (1)-(3) of Table IV.
While these two bills are complex in their implications, there were certain instances
of an alignment of special and constituent interests in favor of mortgage credit expansion.
30See the statement of administration policy available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=24851
21Two such examples were the vote on Amendment 600 of the 2005 bill (column (6)) and the
passage vote of the bill in column (9) of Table IV. As mentioned in section 2, Amendment
600 aimed to limit the systemic risk role of the GSEs’ portfolios by allowing the regulator
to require disposition of speciﬁc assets or liabilities. Politicians with ties to both special
interests and constituent interests (i.e. from congressional districts with high subprime share
of the population) display a statistically higher propensity to vote against the amendment, as
reported in the full speciﬁcation of column (6). The ﬁnal passage vote of the bill, in column
(9), presents the same type of alignment. Politicians with ties to constituent interests also
are more likely to vote in favor the Amendment 207 of the 2007 bill, as reported in the full
speciﬁcation of column (6) of Table V. Amendment 207 aimed at requiring only safety and
soundness considerations as motivation for regulatory intervention in requiring modiﬁcation
of GSEs portfolios, excluding systemic risk as valid consideration.
There is one important note on these results: the share of African Americans in a district
has the opposite sign relative to the eﬀect of subprime share in columns (6) and (9) of both
Tables IV and Table V. Further, the coeﬃcient on subprime share changes with the inclusion
of this variable. Looking at the CSPAN record of the House ﬂoor debate one learns that
the Congressional Black Caucus turned against both bills after speciﬁc activist groups were
excluded through ad hoc amendments as beneﬁciaries of certain important provisions of the
bill. This instance shows the diﬃculty in properly decomposing constituent interests in order
to identify winners and losers from legislation.31 Hence, the eﬀect of subprime share must
be interpreted conditional on the racial proﬁle of the district.
VII. Conclusions
The expansion of mortgage credit to low income and low credit quality households
during the 2002 to 2006 period is historically unique and is responsible for the subsequent
31It is instructive to observe how the two dimensions confound the coeﬃcient of subprime share in columns
(5) and (8) of Tables IV and V. For a discussion see Peltzman (1984), Nunez and Rosenthal (2004), and
Mian, Suﬁ, and Trebbi (2010).
22mortgage default crisis. We present suggestive evidence that this increase in mortgage credit
corresponded to a period in which special interests, as measured by campaign contributions
from mortgage lenders, and constituent interests, as measured by the fraction of subprime
borrowers in a congressional district, appear to be inﬂuencing politician voting behavior.
We show that campaign contributions and lobbying expenditure by mortgage lenders
increased sharply during this period, and campaign contributions from mortgage lenders in-
creasingly targeted representatives from high subprime share congressional districts. More-
over, the fraction of constituents with low credit scores and mortgage lender campaign con-
tributions exerts increasing power over politician voting patterns on legislation related to
housing and mortgages. Evidence from speciﬁc votes and co-sponsorships, although weaker,
also suggests a conﬂuence of special and constituent interest inﬂuence on representatives of
both parties.
W h i l et h ev i e wt h a tm o r t g a g el e n d e r sa r ec o m p l e t e l ya tf a u l tt h r o u g hl o b b y i n gb e h a v i o r
may be popular in the current environment, our ﬁndings suggest a more nuanced reality.
P r e s s u r eo nt h eU . S .g o v e r n m e n tt oe x p a n ds u b p r i m ec r e d i tc a m ef r o mboth mortgage lenders
and subprime borrowers.32
There is one important caveat: given the nature of political inﬂuence and the complex-
ity of government decisions that aﬀect mortgage markets, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a “smoking
gun” which shows with certainty the determinants of government policy. Our ﬁndings should
therefore be viewed as suggestive evidence of the inﬂuence of subprime borrowers and lenders
on policy. However, together with this study, an increasing body of research supports the
view that constituent and special interest pressure on the U.S. government played an impor-
tant role in both the rise and collapse of mortgage credit (Igan, Mishra, and Tressel (2009),
Mian, Suﬁ, and Trebbi (2010)). We look forward to additional research that attempts to
isolate the channels through which these interests helped fuel the expansion of subprime
credit.
32See Bombardini and Trebbi (2008a) for an analysis the simultaneous relationship between campaign
contributions and constituents electoral weigh in political bargaining.
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26Table I 
Summary Statistics 
              
Panel A: Summary Statistics           
 N  Mean  S.D.  10
th  50
th 90
th   
               
Mortgage Industry 
Contributions 




3,480 113,268  159,563 15,985 70,075 249,579 
 
Subprime share (<660)  3,480  0.33  0.09  0.23  0.32  0.47   
Republican  3,481  0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00   
DW NOMINATE 1  3,444  0.04  0.46  -0.54  0.10  0.60   
Financial Serv. 
Committee 
3,477  0.15 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
Mortgage  Default  Rate 3,480 0.034  0.020 0.014 0.031 0.058   
Percent Hispanic  3,480  0.096 0.142 0.009 0.039 0.256   
Percent  Black  3,480 0.118  0.150 0.010 0.058 0.305   
HH Median Income  3,480 44,626 11,780 31,718 42,094 62,208   
Percent in Poverty  3,480  0.13  0.06  0.06  0.11  0.20   
Education less than HS  3,480  0.20 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.31   
Education  HS  3,480  0.29 0.07 0.20 0.29 0.37   
Urban  3,480  0.79 0.20 0.48 0.85 1.00   
              
Panel B: Voting Patterns On Major Mortgage Related 
Legislation 
    
 
  Republicans   Democrats     
 N  In  Favor    N  In Favor     
ADDA Cospon.  229  30.1%    204  13.2%     
Ney Cospon.  232  9.9%    203  8.9%     
Miller Cospon. 2005  232  0.0%    203  32.5%     
Miller Cospon. 2007  199  0.5%    236  11.4%     
Miller Pssg. Vote2007  188  34.0%    230  98.7%     
Cospon. FHFRA 2005  232  8.6%    203  0.0%     
Amdt. 600 FHFRA 2005  223  31.4%    196  1.5%     
FHFRA Pssg. Vote 2005  224  93.3%    197  61.9%     
Cospon. FHFRA 2007  223  0.01%    203  0.01%     
Amdt. 207 FHFRA 2007  225  85.3%    194  98.4%     
FHFRA Pssg. Vote 2007  224  54.0%    193  99.4%     
              





  Table II 
Determinants Of Key Mortgage Legislation (Industry Campaign Contributions): 
American Dream Downpayment Act and Responsible Lending Act Co-sponsorship 
  ADDA Co-sponsorship (2003)    Responsible Lending Act Co-sponsorship (2005)   
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)   
               
Log Mortgage Industry Contributions  0.016 0.019 0.011   0.019 0.017 0.005  
  [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]**    [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*   
Log Finance Contributions    -0.004  -0.009     0.009  0.004   
      (Excluding Mortgage Industry)   [0.016]  [0.016]     [0.004]**  [0.003]   
Subprime share (<660)    -0.112  0.489     0.08  -0.035   
   [0.230]  [0.449]     [0.157]  [0.267]   
Ideology Score    0.169  0.138     0.023  0.022   
    [0.038]*** [0.045]***    [0.025]  [0.028]   
Does he/she serve of       0.358      0.389   
Finance committee?      [0.062]***      [0.060]***   
%age Hispanic      -0.432      -0.024   
      [0.275]      [0.158]   
%age Black      -0.352      0.16   
      [0.229]      [0.165]   
Log Median HH Income      0.19      -0.046   
      [0.253]      [0.162]   
%age in poverty      0.499      -0.448   
      [1.161]      [0.833]   
%age less than high school      0.251      0.168   
      [0.496]      [0.269]   
%age only high school      -0.02      0.217   
     [0.459]      [0.334]   
N  423 420 420   435 429 429  
R
2  0.02 0.06 0.16   0.07 0.07 0.29  
This table presents the determinants of co-sponsorship of key mortgage legislation. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* Coefficient estimate 
statistically distinct from 0 at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
  Table III 
Determinants Of Key Mortgage Legislation (Constituents): 
Miller Legislation 2005 and 2007 
 Co-sponsorship (2005)  Co-sponsorship (2007)  Passage Vote (2007) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                  
Log Mortgage Industry 
Contributions  0.005  0.007 0.001 0.01  0.008 -0.003 0.014  0.006 0.006 
  [0.004] [0.004]*  [0.004]  [0.003]***  [0.003]*** [0.002]  [0.006]** [0.004]  [0.004] 
Log Finance Contributions     -0.017 -0.017   0.005  -0.004   0.006 0.005 
      (Excl. Mortgage Industry)    [0.008]** [0.007]**   [0.005]  [0.004]    [0.007]  [0.008] 
Subprime share (<660)    1.075 -0.589    0.268 -0.266    -0.194 0.162 
   [0.192]***  [0.284]**    [0.142]* [0.238]    [0.145] [0.308] 
Ideology  Score    -0.324 -0.218   -0.11  -0.106   -0.696 -0.71 
    [0.032]*** [0.038]***   [0.021]*** [0.022]***   [0.028]*** [0.031]*** 
Does he/she serve of       0.161      0.283      -0.001 
Finance  committee?     [0.042]***    [0.049]***     [0.043] 
%age Hispanic      0.482    0.235     0.496 
     [0.180]***    [0.128]*     [0.196]** 
%age Black      1.652    0.698     0.016 
     [0.153]***    [0.190]***     [0.147] 
Log Median HH Income      -0.48      -0.359      0.185 
     [0.168]***    [0.133]***     [0.185] 
%age in poverty      -1.815      -1.876      0.268 
     [0.833]**    [0.663]***     [0.809] 
%age less than high school      -0.391      -0.162      -0.713 
     [0.373]    [0.246]     [0.346]** 
%age only high school      -0.711      -0.5      1.311 
     [0.322]**    [0.264]*     [0.373]*** 
N  435  429 429 435 435 435 418  418 418 
R
2  0.001  0.33 0.51 0.03 0.09 0.29 0.01  0.59 0.6 
This table presents the determinants of co-sponsorship and voting of key mortgage legislation. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* Coefficient 
estimate statistically distinct from 0 at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 Table IV 
Determinants Of Key Mortgage Legislation: 
Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2005 
 Co-sponsorship  Amendment 600 (Rejected)  Passage Vote 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                  
Log Mortgage Industry 
Contributions  0.009 0.008 0.003 -0.009  -0.005 -0.009 0.003  0.001  0.012 
  [0.002]***  [0.002]***  [0.002]*  [0.005]* [0.005]  [0.005]*  [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.006]** 
Log Finance Contributions     0.005 0.003   -0.009  -0.004    0.013 0.011 
      (Excl. Mortgage Industry)    [0.002]**  [0.002]   [0.010] [0.011]   [0.012] [0.011] 
Subprime share (<660)    -0.011  0.065    -0.434 -1.214  -0.239  1.011 
    [0.107] [0.196]   [0.169]** [0.390]***   [0.229]  [0.388]*** 
Ideology  Score    0.082 0.073   0.333 0.373   0.33  0.235 
    [0.019]*** [0.020]***   [0.032]*** [0.037]***   [0.044]*** [0.050]*** 
Does  he/she  serve  of      0.147     0.048     -0.239 
Finance  committee?    [0.045]***     [0.048]     [0.057]*** 
%age  Hispanic    -0.071     0.293     -0.211 
    [0.176]     [0.206]     [0.238] 
%age  Black    -0.038     0.6     -0.831 
    [0.107]     [0.171]***     [0.244]*** 
Log  Median  HH  Income    0.067     -0.264     0.291 
    [0.154]     [0.214]     [0.223] 
%age  in  poverty    -0.206     -1.877     0.607 
    [0.654]     [0.905]**     [1.114] 
%age less than high school      0.356      0.728      -0.148 
    [0.330]     [0.443]     [0.476] 
%age  only  high  school    0.281     -0.407     1.329 
    [0.306]     [0.451]     [0.473]*** 
                  
                  
N  435 429 429 419  413 413 421  415 415 
R
2  0.03 0.07 0.14 0.01  0.23 0.25 0.001  0.18 0.27 
This table presents the determinants of co-sponsorship and voting of key mortgage legislation. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* Coefficient 
estimate statistically distinct from 0 at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Table V 
Determinants Of Key Mortgage Legislation: 
Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2007 
 Co-sponsorship  Amendment 207 (Accepted)  Passage Vote 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
                  
Log Mortgage Industry 
Contributions  0.004 0.003 0.001 -0.002  -0.004 -0.002 0.004  -0.003 0.001 
  [0.002]** [0.001]** [0.001]  [0.003]  [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]  [0.004] [0.004] 
Log Finance Contributions     0.002 0.0001    0.001 -0.001    0.011 0.008 
      (Excl. Mortgage Industry)    [0.002] [0.002]   [0.012] [0.012]   [0.007] [0.009] 
Subprime share (<660)    -0.006  0.04    -0.08 0.577   -0.32  0.02 
    [0.061] [0.096]   [0.136] [0.297]*   [0.155]**  [0.364] 
Ideology  Score    0.0004 0.0004   -0.191  -0.216    -0.602  -0.603 
    [0.012] [0.015]   [0.034]***  [0.040]***    [0.030]***  [0.033]*** 
Does  he/she  serve  of      0.06     -0.047     -0.026 
Finance  committee?    [0.029]**     [0.042]     [0.044] 
%age  Hispanic    -0.078     0.104     -0.169 
    [0.079]     [0.176]     [0.205] 
%age  Black    -0.014     -0.278     -0.356 
    [0.082]     [0.167]*     [0.164]** 
Log  Median  HH  Income    0.046     0.115     0.645 
    [0.073]     [0.167]     [0.197]*** 
%age  in  poverty    0.312     0.604     3.165 
    [0.388]     [0.808]     [0.860]*** 
%age less than high school      -0.102      -0.814      -0.326 
    [0.133]     [0.411]**     [0.394] 
%age  only  high  school    -0.147     0.273     2.032 
    [0.129]     [0.403]     [0.391]*** 
                  
                  
N  435 435 435 419  419 419 417  417 417 
R
2  0.02 0.02 0.06 0.001  0.12 0.14 0.001  0.49 0.53 
This table presents the determinants of co-sponsorship and voting of key mortgage legislation. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* Coefficient 
estimate statistically distinct from 0 at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Figure 1 
Congressional District Match Quality across 2000 Census 
This figure presents histogram of how well congressional districts match after redistricting of congressional 
boundaries following the 2000 census. “Match Quality” is defined as the percentage of population in the newly 
redistricted 108
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Total Campaign Contributions and Lobbying 
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Lobbying expenditure from mortgage lendersFigure 2B 
Lobbying Expenditures In Reports Including HUD As Agency Lobbied 
This figure presents Senate Office of Public Records lobbying expenditure by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and 
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Lobbying HUD: Expenditures from GSEs and CountrywideFigure 3 
Relative Campaign Contribution Growth in Subprime Congressional Districts 
This figure presents the relative growth in mortgage industry and non-mortgage financial industry campaign 
contributions in subprime congressional districts. It plots the coefficients ߚ௧ in the following specification (run at 
congressional district times congressional cycle level): ܻ ௖௧ ൌߙ ௧ ൅ߛכܵ ݑ ܾ ܲ ݎ ݅ ݉ ݁ ௖ ൅ߚ ௧ כ ሺܵݑܾܲݎ݅݉݁௖ כߙ ௧ሻ൅ߝ ௖௧ , 
where ܻ ௖௧ is log of campaign contributions (plus one) to a given congressional district during a congressional 
cycle, and ܵݑܾܲݎ݅݉݁௖ measures the share of population in a district that has a credit score below 620 as of 2000. 
The “omitted” congressional cycle is 2000 in regressions. Since campaign contributions may be zero for some 
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Total Mortgage-Industry Related Roll Calls 
This figure presents the total number of roll call votes in each congressional cycle that are mortgage industry 
related. We classify a vote as “mortgage industry related” if it has any of the following three terms in its 
description: “affordable housing”, “homeownership” and “subprime”. 






























Sensitivity of Mortgage Legislation to Mortgage Special Interest  
This figure plots the percentage of coefficients in each congressional cycle on variables representing special 
interest (log of mortgage industry campaign contributions to a congressional district) that are significant at 5% 
level. In each congressional cycle, we regress roll call votes on mortgage industry-related legislation on log of 
mortgage industry contributions, log of non-mortgage industry contributions, share of population that is 
subprime, DW-nominate ideology score, and controls for politician seniority, financial committee membership 
and congressional district income and demographics. 
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Congressional cycleFigure 6 
Sensitivity of Mortgage Legislation to Constituent Interest 
This figure plots the percentage of coefficients in each congressional cycle on variables representing constituent 
interest (fraction of congressional district population that is “subprime”) that are significant at 5% level. In each 
congressional cycle, we regress roll call votes on mortgage industry related legislation on log of mortgage 
industry contributions, log of non-mortgage industry contributions, share of population that is subprime, DW-
nominate ideology score, and controls for politician seniority, financial committee membership and 
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Congressional cycleFigure 7 
Sensitivity of Mortgage Legislation to Non-Mortgage Special Interest 
This figure plots the percentage of coefficients in each congressional cycle on variables representing financial 
special interest other than the mortgage industry (log of non-mortgage financial industry campaign contributions 
to a congressional district) that are significant at 5% level. In each congressional cycle, we regress roll call votes 
on mortgage industry related legislation on log of mortgage industry contributions, log of non-mortgage industry 
contributions, share of population that is subprime, DW-nominate ideology score, and controls for politician 
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Congressional cycleAppendix Figure 
Sensitivity of Mortgage Legislation to Special Interest and Constituent Interest  
(No Extra Controls) 
This figure plots the percentage of coefficients in each congressional cycle on variables representing special 
interest (log of mortgage industry campaign contributions) and constituent interest (fraction of congressional 
district population that is “subprime”) that are significant at 5% level. In each congressional cycle, we regress roll 
call votes on mortgage industry related legislation on log of mortgage industry contributions, log of non-
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